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Introduction
Owing to a still high number of level crossing 
incidents, the Union for the Development of 
the Moravian-Silesian Region and the Czech 
Technology Platform on Industrial Safety   submitted 
a topic for the project “Assessment and Management 
of Level Crossing Risks”, in which the Railway 
Infrastructure Administration (henceforth referred 
to as SŽDC) also participated. In the introductory 
part of the project, an overview of legislation 
concerning level crossings and a general theory 
of types of level crossings in the Czech Republic 
and abroad are presented. In the second part of the 
project, statistics for level crossing accident rates 
in the world, in the Czech Republic, and in the 
Moravian-Silesian Region are provided. Particular 
factors affecting the occurrence of level crossing 
incidents are plotted and evaluated graphically. The 
project included a questionnaire survey on the topic 
“Perception of Level Crossing Risks”. The fourth 
part of the project is devoted to the analysis of level 
crossing risks. Selected scenarios of incidents that 
may occur on specifi c level crossings are evaluated 
using different methods. In the next part, the selected 
scenarios are dealt with and modelled on the specifi c 
level crossings. At the end, all parts of the project 
are evaluated and measures are proposed to reduce 
level crossing risks and to decrease the number of 
incidents and thus the number of injured persons.
Materials and Methods
Level Crossings
A level crossing according to Act No. 266/1994 
Coll., on rail systems as subsequently amended 
(Zákon, 1994) is defi ned as a point of a railway 
crossing with a surface road at the level of rails. In 
the mentioned Act, Section 6, it is stated that if the 
railway is crossing a road at the level of rails, the rail 
transport operation shall have the right of way over 
the transport on road communications. Each level 
crossing, regardless the type of level crossing, must 
be equipped with a crossbuck or another type of 
crossing safety device. If all the standards, decrees 
and regulations on the design, construction and 
maintenance of level crossings are fulfi lled, level 
crossings can be regarded as safe. In spite of the fact 
that the above-mentioned legal aspects are satisfi ed, 
many people die annually of just level crossing 
accidents.
Rate of Level Crossing Accidents in 
the Moravian-Silesian Region
The level crossing accidents do not avoid the 
Moravian-Silesian Region (henceforth referred to as 
MSR), to which the project was orientated, either. In 
the territory of MSR, there are 647 level crossings 
falling within the scope of SŽDC Ostrava (see Tab. 1).
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Tab. 1 Overview of level crossings in MSR
In the years 2005 - 2009, 101 accidents occurred 
at these crossings; 56 persons were injured, 
19 persons died and altogether the value of damage 
to property exceeded CZK 16.5 . 106 (SDC Ostrava, 
2005 - 2009). The numbers of accidents in individual 
years in the given area are presented in Graph 1.
Graph 1 Accident rate in MSR in 2005 - 2009
To assess the accident rate in this region, rather 
detailed analyses for the period of last fi ve years, 
i.e. the years 2005 - 2009, were carried out. As an 
example, Graph 2 is given below. 
Graph 2 Effects of accidents on persons in 
2005 - 2009
Perception of Level Crossing Risks
Too often, tragic level crossing accidents are 
reported in the news; the main reason of them being 
a driver’s error. The knowledge of human failure 
causes can help fi nding effective pathways to prevent 
the failure. All road traffi c participants know what 
traffi c lights look like, what is the meaning of the 
lights signalling, and know what to do when the red, 
yellow, and green lights are on. However, what is 
the cause of the fact that red lights at level crossings 
are not perceived and respected to the same degree 
as red lights at crossroads? If we think about this, 
consequences of showing little respect for them 
at level crossings are usually more serious than at 
crossroads.
An incentive for the creation of the questionnaire 
was just this different behaviour of and perception of 
possible risks by drivers and also other road traffi c 
participants on level crossings and at the junction.
Questionnaire Survey
The aims of the questionnaire survey were:
• To defi ne and specify the road traffi c participants at 
level crossings who took part in the questionnaire 
survey.
• To evaluate the knowledge of road traffi c 
participants in the area of level crossings.
• To evaluate the infl uence of external conditions 
and stereotype on the satisfaction of level crossing 
regulations.
• The view of road traffi c participants of the 
perception of level crossing risks.
To accomplish the set objectives, the method of 
sociological survey, namely written questioning, 
was used. The questionnaire was anonymous and 
comprised 13 closed questions. 
Outputs of Questionnaire Survey
Altogether, 340 questionnaires were sent to 
respondents in the period from the beginning of July 
to the end of September 2010; 175 questionnaires 
were returned completed.
Participants in the survey were men and also 
women of various age groups, with different 
lengths of driving experience. From the evaluation 
of the questionnaires it followed that two thirds of 
respondents were men; the 25 - 34 year age group 
was the largest. From the questionnaire it has been 
found that respondents e.g.: 
• consider a level crossing a crossroads,
• have most frequently failed to notice and crossed 
a level crossing equipped with a crossbuck,
• know the speed with which they are permitted to 
enter a level crossing,
• state that the most frequent cause of failing to 
notice signs and markings and of passing through 
a level crossing  is the fact that the driver is in 
a hurry and ignores traffi c signs and markings,
• do not know any campaign focused on level 
crossing safety. (Žitníková et al., 2010).
Overview of level crossings on lines in MSR - by 
type of safety device
Crossings equipped merely with a crossbuck 398
Crossings equipped with a crossing safety device 
(CSD)
249• Crossings equipped with warning lights - total 235
• Crossings equipped with a mechanical CSD 14
Total number of crossings 647
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Results
Analysis of Level Crossing Risks
The basic step in the process of reducing risks is 
naturally the analysis of the risks. The risk analysis is 
usually understood as a process of the determination of 
threats, the probability of the implementation of these 
threats and their consequences, i.e. the determination 
of risks and the severity of risks. The risk analysis 
becomes the decisive basis for the process of the 
elimination of level crossing risks.
The aim of the analysis is to assess level crossing 
risks using selected methods. We assessed the risks 
as a whole set; however, for obtaining more accurate 
results of specifi c level crossings, it is more suitable 
to approach every level crossing individually and 
thus take into account given properties of the level 
crossing, the amount of traffi c on it, local conditions, 
and others.
Description of System Evaluated
In the fi rst stage, it was necessary to defi ne the 
boundaries that would be used for the risk analysis. 
For the needs of the risk analysis, these boundaries 
were divided into two areas: legislative framework 
and level crossing itself. 
 
For carrying out the risk analysis, level crossing 
boundaries running from a traffi c sign showing 
a 240 m distance from the level crossing as illustrated 
in Fig. 1 were determined. From this point, selected 
methods of risk analysis will be applied.
Furthermore, level crossing traffi c participants 
had to be defi ned generally, i.e. road traffi c 
participants as well as railway traffi c participants. 
The following step was the specifi cation of dangerous 
substances (toxic, combustible, explosive, and 
others). For the needs of the risk analysis, substances 
were divided into liquid and gaseous substances as 
shown in Fig. 2. The kind and the type of chosen 
substances correspond best to materials transported 
by road as well as by rail.
 
Carrying out the Risk Analysis
For carrying out the risk analysis, the following 
procedure was proposed:
1) application of “What - If” method, 
The method “What - If” processes in a form of 
scenarios the incidents that may occur on a level 
crossing. Not all the combinations of crushes 
between cars and rail means of transport are included 
here. The considered scenarios can affect both 
traffi c participants (injuries, casualties, fi nancial 
losses) and the proper surroundings of the level 
crossing (endangering persons in the vicinity of 
the level crossing, potential affection of individual 
components of the environment by a dangerous 
substance). The following representative scenarios 
were selected: 
a) an accident between a tank lorry transporting 
a dangerous substance and a passenger train (in 
combination with the injury of participants and 
release of dangerous substance - 1A - 1D),
b) an accident between a tank lorry and a goods 
train - both transporting dangerous substances (in 
combination with the injury of participants and 
release of dangerous substance - 2A - 2D),  
c) an accident between a car and a passenger train 
(with/without the injury of participants - 3A - 3B)
d) an accident between a bus and a passenger train 
(with/without the injury of participants - 4A - 4B).
These selected representative scenarios serve as 
input data for the FMEA method.
Fig. 2 Overview of possible scenarios of incidents during 
the transport of dangerous substances, modifi ed according 
to (Přibyl et al., 2010)
Fig. 1 Railway crossing boundaries for carrying out the 
risk analysis
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2) application of FMEA method.
The analysis of risks was made using the method 
FMEA in a form of tables. For the analysis, the below 
mentioned formula and indices are used as a basis:
(1)
RPN Risk Priority Number,
S dimensionless number that classifi es severity,
O classifi es occurrence probability,
D classifi es detection, i.e. how likely it is for a 
failure to be identifi ed or detected (ČSN, 2007). 
Values calculated from the above-mentioned 
formula (1) for the level of risk are included in 
Graph 3. The risk level moves in the interval 
(0,1000>. Real up to slightly overestimated values 
of particular indices are selected to increase safety.
Results of Risk Analysis
From the above-mentioned and performed 
analyses it has followed that the most severe risks are:
Discussion of Results
As a consequence of crash between a bus and 
a passenger train, a high number of people are 
potentially endangered. Many passengers may be 
injured and killed. With such incident, a diffi cult 
intervention of fi re brigades and the emergency 
treatment of injured persons by emergency medical 
service are connected. People who are participants 
in such an accident may suffer psychical injury/
trauma that will accompany them for the rest of 
their lives. As a consequence, they will not be able 
to travel by such means (bus, train) any more in 
order to avoid the same situation. In a crash between 
a car and a passenger train, an important factor is the 
high probability of accident occurrence, because the 
frequency of cars is the highest of the frequencies of 
all above-mentioned means of transport. Moreover, 
in the course of evaluation of basic data on level 
crossing accidents, the majority of accidents were 
caused by drivers of cars. As for a crash between 
a tank lorry transporting dangerous substances and 
a passenger train, it is obvious that the most important 
factor is the number of directly affected people as 
a consequence of potential accident/traffi c accident 
at the level crossing (either direct endangering 
passengers’ health, or endangering the health of the 
driver of the tank lorry due to the accident or the 
release of dangerous substance).
Proposed Measures 
The proposed measures following from the 
comprehensive solving of the problems of level 
crossings could be divided, according to their 
character, into the following three groups: technical 
measures, organisational measures and educational 
measures. The specifi c groups are characterised and 
analysed below.
1) Technical Measures
Technical measures are such measures that 
eliminate the occurrence of a fault. They should be 
as cheap as possible yet effective.
a) Replacement of Gate 
An effective way to prevent the entry to the 
crossing is to replace the existing protection gate 
by another type of barrier that should completely 
prevent the entry. This is of course very expensive 
but well-tried, e.g. in Spain. Crossings are protected 
here by means of rising posts. The level crossing is 
equipped with an optical and an acoustic signalling 
device; after their activation, the posts start to rise 
from the ground. This type of protection has replaced 
the existing gate (barrier). This type of protection 
is not entirely unknown in the Czech Republic. It 
RPN S O D  
Graph 3 Graphical representation of results of FMEA
1-2) 294 points 4B A crash between a bus and 
a passenger train involving 
the injury of accident 
participants.
3B A crash between a car and 
a passenger train involving 
the injury of accident 
participants. 
3) 210 points 4A A crash between a bus and a 
passenger train involving no 
injury of accident participants.
4-5) 196 points 1D A crash between a tank 
lorry transporting dangerous 
substances and a passenger 
train involving the injury of 
participants and the release of 
dangerous substance.
3A A crash between a car and a 
passenger train involving no 
injury of accident participants.
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can be met on roads, but not at level crossings. The 
advantages of the application of such protection 
equipment to level crossings are an increase in 
safety and the prevention of vehicles entry to 
level crossings. The disadvantages of this piece of 
equipment are the costs of purchase and assembly.
Fig. 3 Rising posts
b) Change in Type of Optical Signalling Device
As for light signalling devices, it would be 
suitable to use diodes instead of present-day lights. 
Diodes can be seen better even when blinded by sun 
glare, in fog, under the conditions of poor visibility, 
and others. New indicators using LED technology 
have already been tested in the Czech Republic. By 
testing it has been found that the lights can be seen 
much better in sharp sunshine; even from the extreme 
angles of view, when the light of lamps is less visible. 
The advantages are the longer life of LEDs and 
the fact that each of three lights of the indicator is 
fi tted with 137 LEDs that are electronically divided 
into three independent circuits - segments. In case 
of fault in one circuit, the remaining LEDs (about 
90 pcs) emit light suffi cient for fulfi lling standards 
and regulations on the luminous intensity of 
indicators. (Silnice a železnice, 2010).
c) Change in Traffi c Signs
For the selected level crossings with an increased 
number of traffi c accidents, we recommend to use 
a warning traffi c board “Caution, frequent accident 
level crossing” (see Figure 4) similarly to road 
traffi c, where in the selected parts there are traffi c 
signs warning of frequent accident points. The 
designed traffi c sign could be classed to the group 
of warning traffi c signs and designated as sign No. 
A 34; in combination with the traffi c sign No. A 31c 
it could (80 m ahead of crossing) warn of a level 
crossing at which traffi c accidents occur frequently. 
(Žitníková et al., 2011)
d) Making Traffi c Signs More Conspicuous
An important point is also making level crossing 
signs more conspicuous. It would be suitable to 
use red refl ex refl ectors, which can be seen better 
by drivers under the conditions of poor visibility, 
instead of red stripes.
e) Additional Markings
To additional markings, light guide strips 
(cat’s eyes) belong. A light strip would either 
draw the attention of drivers to the level crossing 
permanently, or the lights would be switched on 
after the activation of the crossing safety device 
by a coming rail vehicle. Before the level crossing, 
drivers would be warned by means of a row of high-
intensity LED warning lights placed across the road. 
Another possible way of road marking would be the 
use of so-called “optical-psychological brake” with 
acoustic effect, such as several stripes running across 
the road before a level crossing. These manners have 
already been dealt with in a project of Ministry of 
Transport (Ministry of Transport, 2010).
f) Camera System and Dummy Cameras
An effective way to prevent passing through 
level crossings after activation of signalling devices 
is the installation of cameras that begin recording 
simultaneously with the activation of signalling 
devices or shortly before the activation. If the driver 
is aware that his/her behaviour is being observed, his/
her behaviour is more responsible and in accordance 
with regulations. This manner of prevention is 
already utilised in some places; however, this 
method is very diffi cult from the organisational point 
Fig. 4 Design of traffi c sign “Caution, frequent accident 
level crossing”
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of view (records must be checked, drivers breaking 
regulations must be identifi ed and fi ned), from the 
fi nancial point of view and also from the safety 
point of view. The proper purchase and operation of 
a camera system is expensive, not mentioning the 
fact that cameras may be stolen or destroyed. For 
this reason, cameras could be replaced by dummy 
cameras, and from time to time, moved from the 
level crossings where they are used to other selected 
level crossings.
g) To Execute Changes
The purpose of this measure is to execute such 
changes in a signalling device and in its immediate 
surroundings that will be able to disturb the driver‘s 
stereotyped acting, such as change in the sound of 
the signalling device, etc., but will be in accordance 
with relevant standards and regulations.
2) Organisational Measures
Organisational measures should be divided 
according to their scope of competence and powers. 
a) Police of the Czech Republic, Municipal Police
- more frequent inspection of traffi c at level 
crossings, fi ning of drivers breaking the road 
traffi c regulations,
- interpretation of camera records,
- organisation of educational actions for children in 
schools.
b) Employee of SŽDC - Rail Transport Engineer
- to keep regular checks of signs and markings, 
- to keep regular checks of sight conditions,
- to keep regular checks of functionality of 
signalling devices,
- all checks should be conducted by a person 
unfamiliar with the given level crossing and 
its surroundings to avoid ignoring possible 
worsened conditions owing to the good 
knowledge of local conditions and stereotype.
c) In General
- formation of a database on hazardous crossings in 
the region,
- clarifi cation of competence, authorities and 
responsibilities of organisations as for individual 
safety devices, signs and markings, and others,
- making legislation and recourse stricter in the case 
of not obeying the regulations of road traffi c at 
level crossings,
- preparation of publications, leafl ets on “How to 
behave at level crossings?” and “How to behave at 
a level crossing in case of accident?”,
- media pressure, better awareness, e.g. of accident 
rate statistics, 
- not to carry out nationwide media campaigns, but 
to focus on specifi c areas, regions, because people 
are more sensitive to and interested in things that 
happen in their surroundings than at the other end 
of the country.
3) Educational Measures
Educational measures are to increase the public 
awareness of hazards associated with level crossings, 
of the prevention of these hazards and of how to 
behave in the case of accident at a level crossing. 
The proposals are divided into groups according 
to the target groups for which they are intended:
• basic schools
- inclusion of educational actions and traffi c 
education in the teaching-learning process at 
basic schools,
- distribution of instructional fi lms on behaviour 
at level crossings to schools,
• driving schools
- to increase attention paid to level crossing 
problems in teaching at driving schools, 
- by driving simulators, instructional fi lms 
drawing attention to hazards by means of 
information on road traffi c regulations when 
passing through level crossings and information 
on how drivers and other persons are to behave if 
being a participant in an level crossing accident 
(where to call, what to report, etc.),
• the public
- information on behaviour at level crossings 
intended for drivers and also for pedestrians, 
- fi ning pedestrians, cyclists for going around the 
closed gate at level crossings.
In the course of implementation of these 
measures, attention should be paid especially to 
feedback. This means that after a given time period, 
tests and surveys will be carried out that will verify 
the effi ciency of measures implemented. (Žitníková 
et al., 2011).
Conclusion
The goal of the project on the topic “Assessment 
and Management of Level Crossing Risks” dealt with 
for several months was to make a comprehensive 
analysis of the safety of level crossings in the 
Moravian-Silesian Region, covering technical as 
well as legislative aspects and also human factor 
issues. 
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Of the above-mentioned proposed measures 
to reduce risks, the following measures are 
recommended preferentially:
- Increase in the level of level crossings protection 
(installation of gates).
- Making level crossing additional signs and 
markings more conspicuous (optically and 
acoustically).
-  Improvement of awareness and education of 
road traffi c participants (campaigns, driving 
schools, pupils of basic schools and students of 
secondary schools).
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